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motorists in the United States. The principal case seems to indicate
that the court, in furtherance of the basic policy of the doctrine, does
not wish to impair its utility by imposing technical standards for its use.
Thus, from Small v. Mallory it may be inferred that if there is any
evidence of control in the defendant, it will be sufficient to withstand
his motion of nonsuit on the issue of liability under the family purpose
doctrine.
JAcK W. FLOYD
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Denial of Confrontation to
Witnesses in Loyalty-Security Hearings
The issue of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in
loyalty-security hearings was presented to the United States Supreme
Court in the recent case of Greene v. McElroy.' Greene was an aero-
nautical engineer employed as general manager and vice-president of a
private corporation which was doing classified research for the Navy
under contract. Such contracts incorporated by reference2 a condition
that the contractor was to exclude from the job all persons not cleared
for access to classified information.
Although Greene had been previously cleared,3 the corporation was
notified by the Secretary of the Navy in April 1953 that his clearance
was revoked and that he was to be denied access to any classified in-
formation. This led to Greene's discharge. He appealed to the Eastern
Industrial Personnel Security Board (EIPSB), and a hearing was held
at which he was subjected to intense cross-examination by the board
without the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
4
EIPSB affirmed the order of revocation and this action was affirmed by
1360 U.S. 474 (1959).
2 All government contracts for classified work incorporated by reference the
Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 66 (1954).
' Greene was given a Confidential clearance by the Army in August 1949, a Top
Secret clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Military District of Washing-
ton in November 1949, and a Top Secret clearance by the Air Materiel Command
in February 1950. 360 U.S. at 476 n.1. In 1951 Greene's clearance was withdrawn
but was restored by the Industrial Employment Review Board (IERB) in 1952.
In 1953 the Secretary of Defense abolished the Personnel Security Board (PSB)
and the IERB and directed the Secretaries of the three armed services to establish
Regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards. 360 U.S. at 480.
'The revocation of Greene's security clearance was based primarily on incidents
occurring between 1942 and 1947. It was during this period that Greene was living
with his former wife who was alleged to have been an ardent Communist. The
fact that he stayed with her until 1947 seems to be the main reason that the
government suspected that he was a security risk. 360 U.S. at 490. Greene testi-
fied that the main reason for the divorce was that his ex-wife held views with which
he did not concur and was friendly with persons with whom he had little in com-
mon. 360 U.S. at 479. From a review of the record it appears that Greene's
clearance was revoked because of his association with his wife.
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the Industrial Personnel Security Review Board (IPSRB) in 1956.
Greene then started his action in the federal courts.5 On appeal the
Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question concerning the right
of confrontation, and reversed on other grounds the decisions of the
lower courts, which had affirmed the IPSRB ruling.1
In proceedings other than security hearings, where disclosure of
sources of information does not endanger national security, the problems
of confrontation and cross-examination are less acute. Thus, in the
field of criminal law the sixth amendment explicitly secures the right
of confrontation in the federal courts in any case where disclosure of
the informant's identity, or the contents of his communication are rele-
vant to the defense.8  Though the right is less definite in state criminal
Before an employee can get a decision in the federal courts he must first
show that the court has jurisdiction. In the type of case under discussion this
involves two important things. First, he must show that he has a right which
has been violated. In this situation the due process clause of the fifth amendment
is usually invoked to show that a property right has been taken without due process
of law. In the case of government employees there is a question as to whether
the right to employment is a property right. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd inen. by at equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
In the case of the private employee there is the question of whether a security
clearance is a mere privilege to be taken away without procedural due process or
a property right like the license to practice a profession. EX parle Robinson, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965(1920); People ex rel. State Bd. of Health v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N.E. 786
(1888). Secondly, he must show that the issue is justiciable, i.e., that it is a matter
which the courts should and are able to decide, and not a question which can
best be determined by the political departments of the government. The problem
of justiciability has been much discussed by the courts in security type cases.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Adams v. Humphry,
232 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Bailey v. Richardson, supra; Harmon v. Brucker,
137 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 579 (1958).
'The district court in Greene v. Wilson, 150 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957),
denied Greene's motion for summary judgment and granted the government's same
motion on the ground that Greene had shown no invasion of his rights. This
was affirmed in Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), with the hold-
ing that it was not a justiciable controversy because it was an executive decision
as to whether a person was fitted to be assigned to a particular kind of confidential
work. This decision is criticized in Note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 828 (1958).
' The basis of the decision was that there had been no explicit authority from
the President or Congress for the Department of Defense to fashion and apply
an industrial security program which denied the procedural safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination. In the absence of explicit authorization the
Court was not willing to find authority for such restraint on the traditional forms
of a fair proceeding. The Court also said it was not necessary at this time to
decide whether such procedures, where explicitly authorized, would be consti-
tutional. 360 U.S. at 580.
' Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1 (1953). In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held
that even the reports in the files of the F.B.I. must be turned over to the accused
for his use in preparing a defense when such reports contain relevant statements
of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the
trial of the accused. Shortly after this decision Congress passed the Anti-Jencks
Act, 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958), which was enacted to place
limits on the accused and prevent him from making fishing expeditions into the
F.B.I. files hoping to find helpful information.
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proceedings,9 the Court has held that a denial of the right of confronta-
tion in a state proceedings is a denial of due process under the fourteenth
amendment.'0 In the area of civil court proceedings the problem of con-
frontation has presented little difficulty as it has been dealt with ade-
quately by the "hearsay rule" and an established right of cross-exam-
ination.:" Finally, in the field of administrative hearings where there
is no question of the national security being endangered, the parties have
the full right of confrontation and cross-examination both in federal
and state proceedings.' 2
The "cold war" situation has provided some execptions to the ele-
ments of procedural due process which heretofore have been applied as
a matter of course. The rationale of any resulting deprivation of per-
sonal rights lies in the balancing of national security against individual
rights1 3 The due process provisions of the Constitution are not defini-
tive terms by which it can be said that one certain act is a denial of due
process while another is not. Rather they are applied in the light of the
entire situation.' 4  With the cold war in the background it is not in-
conceivable that the Court will hold that the denial of confrontation is not
a denial of due process where the national security is involved. 15 Much
more than this has been done under the war powers,' 6 and the exigency
of the cold war might likewise be deemed such as to warrant denial of
some procedural rights in the interest of national security.
Thus far the rule that the Supreme Court will avoid all constitutional
8 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).1ot re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). But cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953), where petitioner alleged denial of due process when a confession
of a co-defendant was used against the petitioner who did not have the opportunity
to confront because the co-defendant did not take the witness stand. The Court held
that the right of the co-defendant not to testify was greater than the petitioner's
right to confrontation. However, since this case the Court has reiterated its former
position. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Compare Williams v. NewYork, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), where the Court held that it was not a denial of due
process for the trial court to use confidential information in passing sentence because
the right of confrontation goes only to the establishment of guilt.115 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
"
2Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243
(1943); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S.190 (1933). See also Larche v. Hannah, 176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1959), where
the court followed the principal case in that since the Civil Rights Commission
had not been explicitly authorized to adopt rules that denied confrontation, in-
vestigating state vote registrars without allowing the registrars to face their ac-
cusers was illegal.
3 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
", Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165(1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455(1942). Compare Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
" See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
"0U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214(1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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questions if there is another ground in which a decision may rest,7 has
prevented the Court's determination of the question of whether a person
has a constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination in ad-
ministrative hearings where it is contended that the national security
would be endangered by divulging the source of the information on which
the government bases its charge or decision. The decisions in this area
have usually turned on the construction of a departmental regulation or,
as in the principal case, its authorization.
The issue of confrontation and cross-examination was before the
Court in Bailey v. Richardson,"' where a government employee was
fired for security reasons without being given the opportunity to face or
cross-examine her accusers at the security hearing. And, as typical
in this type of case, the identify of the informant was withheld not
only from the employee, but also from the members of the hearing board
who had to judge its probative value. The Court of Appeals held that
the sixth amendment did not apply because its application is limited
to criminal actions where the accused may be punished,19 and that the
fifth amendment did not apply because government employment is a
privilege, not a property right, nor "life" nor "liberty." The court also
said, "Never in our history has a government administrative employee
been entitled to a hearing of the quasi-judicial type upon his dismissal
from government service." 20 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision
by an equally divided Court without a written opinion.21 This is the
only case that holds that an employee at a security hearing does not have
the right to confront his accusers. In all the recent cases which in-
volved security-dismissals, including the principal case, the Court has
found other grounds on which to reverse the lower courts' decision up-
holding dismissal. 22
There are several different views concerning the right of confronta-
tion in security hearings that have been advanced extrajudicially. 23 One
view is that there should be no right of confrontation because to allow
it would unnecessarily endanger the national security.24 It is argued
x, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
2' 341 U.S. 918 (1951), aflrming mere. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
19 182 F.2d at 55. The dissent took the view that a dismissal for disloyalty is
punishment and requires all the safeguards of a judicial trial. Id. at 69.
20 Id. at 57.
21 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
2 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536
(1956) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
2 3Krasnowiecki, Confrontation by Witnesses in Government Employee Se-
curity Proceeding, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 180 (1958), gives a good summary of
the reasons most commonly advanced against disclosure.
2' The most noted exponent of this doctrine of complete non-disclosure is the
Director of F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover. For a discussion of the Director's views
and reasons, see McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 122(1959).
[Vol. 38
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in support of this view (1) that professional informants must be pro-
tected if the effectiveness of their work is to be unimpaired; (2) that the
casual informant would not volunteer his adverse testimony if required
to do it openly; and (3) that in any event, the use of confidental in-
formants is not unfair to the person who by his own conduct has cre-
ated a doubt as to his loyalty to this country and who, therefore, should
not expect the nation, or its responsible officials, to gamble national
security on his continued status.25 The difficulty with these arguments
is that they assume that there are no other ways to insure a continued
inflow of information which bears on national security but by the use of
undisclosed informers, and that the employee is guilty as charged and
therefore entitled to no procedural rights. Also it is difficult to say that
one by his own conduct has created a doubt as to his loyalty when in fact
it is the conduct or word of the faceless informer which has created the
doubt. If there is no right of confrontation the word of the undisclosed
informant is allowed to create a presumption of disloyalty and the em-
ployee must rebut the presumption by guessing what the basis of the
charge is and then defend himself before a hearing board which most
often does not know the source or reliability of the evidence against the
employee.
Another view is that the employee should have the right to con-
front the casual informant, but not the professional informant.2 6 The
difficulty with this view is obvious; there is no practical way to deter-
mine who is "casual" and who is "professional." Where would you
place the man who works without charge but who constantly gives in-
formation? Furthermore, who is to make the decision? If left with
the investigatory agency in charge, any doubt would probably be re-
solved in favor of security and against the individual as has been the
marked tendency throughout the total operation of the security programs.
It would seem that whether the derogatory information comes from a
casual or professional informant should not be important when the ques-
tion of the constitutional right of confrontation is being considered. The
basic issue remains the same, and this suggested compromise does not
change that issue. The issue for consideration is how such information
is used against the employee at the hearing.
A third view is an alternative to confrontation. Its premise is that
the hearing officer or board should conduct an in camera proceeding
and examine informants privately for the purpose of satisfying them-
" This is the reason advanced by a special committee of the American Bar
Association for its position on the question. U.S. CommIssioN ox GOVERNMENT
SEcURITY, RORT 661 (1957).
"This is the view approved by the Commission on Government Security.
Id. at 668, 670. Proposed legislation adopting this view has been introduced
in Congress, S. 2314, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to replace the present industrial
security program invalidated by the principal case.
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selves as to the reliability of such informants and the truthfulness of the
information they furnish.2 7  This view provides for an unbiased party
to have access to the true basis of the disloyalty charge.28 However, this
view does not meet the issue. It would seem that a third party confront-
ing the informant would not satisfy the reason for the constitutional right
of confrontation, if there is such a right. The accused has a great ad-
vantage over any third party in examining the accuser to determine the
truth, for he will know if and when the informant is lying and by cross-
examination can show this to be a fact.
The fourth view is one which would do away with any practice that
denies the right of confrontation.29 In support of this view it is argued
that if an informant is not willing to testify openly and subject his
reliability to the test of cross-examination, his statement should not be
used to damage another person. It is further argued that the informant
can be used by the investigatory agency to develop leads to independent
evidence 0 that can be disclosed at a subsequent hearing. By this view
the accused would have adequate personal safeguards, and at the same
time the government could conceal the identity of the informant and
thereby maintain his effectiveness. In essence this would parallel the
rule now followed in criminal prosecutions. The difficulty with these
arguments is that in the situation where the only evidence available is
that possessed by the informant the government must either compromise
the effectiveness of future sources of information to the possible detri-
ment of national security or let the alleged security risk remain at his job.
By way of summary it should be pointed out that the first view
assumes that there is no constitutional right of confrontation. The second
and third views appear to be nothing more than compromises in avoid-
ance of the issue. It is only the fourth view that assumes that there is
such a right.
There are many indications that when the constitutional issue of con-
frontation is decided by the Court the decision will be that the denial
27 This policy is used by the Atomic Energy Commission to some extent as
expressed in the revised regulations issued in May of 1956. U.S. Commissrox ON
GOVERNMENT SECURiTy, REPORT 663 (1957); 10 C.F.R. § 4.27(m) (1959).
2" The merits of an it camera proceeding are discussed in Note, 45 CALIF. L.
R v. 524 (1957).
9 This view is supported by the American Jewish Congress. U.S. CommissioN
oN GOVERNMENT SEcuRITY, REPORT 662 (1957).
30 To appreciate the practicality of this argument it is important to know the
sufficiency of evidence necessary to sustain a security dismissal. It need not be a
preponderance of the evidence as in civil litigation, nor must it be beyond a reason-
able doubt as in criminal cases. It is something less than either of these. "Clear-
ance shall be denied or revoked if it is determined, on the basis of all the availableinformation, that access to classified information by the person concerned is not
clearly consistent with the interest of the national security." 32 C.F.R. § 67.3-1(Supp. 1959). (Emphasis added.) The same standard is applied to government
employees. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). For an inter-
pretation of this standard see Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1955).
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of such an important procedural right is a violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. While the majority in Jay v. Boyd, a
deportation case, held the issue to be non-justiciable, four dissenting
justices reached the issue and supported such a right in strong lan-
guage.3 1 Also, in the principal case the Court went much further in its
language expounding on such rights than was necessary in making the
decision arrived at.
Certain principals have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is im-
portant in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more im-
portant where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers
or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, preju-
dice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the
requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have
ancient roots .... This Court has been zealous to protect these
rights from erosion. It has been spoken out not only in criminal
cases . . .but also in all types of cases where administrative and
regulatory action were under scrutiny.
3 2
The Court also quoted Wigmore0 to the effect that there is no
safeguard for the testing of human statements comparable to that fur-
31351 U.S. 345 (1956). (Warren, C. J., dissenting at 362) "Such a hearing
[as Jay had] is not an administrative hearing in the American sense of the term.
It is no hearing .... To me, this is not due process.... I am unwilling to write
such a departure from American standards into the judicial or administrative
process or to impute to Congress an intention to do so in the absence of much
clearer language than it has used here." (Black, J., dissenting at 365, 366) "No
nation can remain true to the ideal of liberty under law and at the same time permit
people to have their homes destroyed and their lives blasted by slurs of unseen
and unsworn informers. There is no possible way to contest the truthfulness of
anonymous accusations. The supposed accuser can neither be identified nor inter-
rogated. He may be the most worthless and irresponsible character in the com-
munity. What he said may be wholly malicious, untrue, unreliable, or inaccurately
reported. In a court of law the triers of fact could not even listen to such gossip,
much fess decide the most trifling issue on it .... Article III of our Constitution
and the Bill of Rights intended that people shall not have valuable rights and priv-
ileges taken away from them by government unless the deprivation occurs after
some kind of court proceeding where witnesses can be confronted and questioned
and where the public can know that the rights of individuals are being protected"
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting at 373) "In this country, if someone dislikes you, or
accused you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. He
cannot assassinate you or your character from behind, without suffering the pen-
alties an outraged citizenry will impose." (Douglas, J., dissenting at 375, 376)
"Fairness, implicit in our notions of due process, requires that any hearing be
full and open with an opportunity to know the charge, and the accusers, to reply
to the charge, and to meet the accusers .... A hearing is not a hearing in the
American sense if faceless informers or confidential information may be used to
deprive a man of his liberty."
360 U.S. at 496.
Id. at 497, citing 5 WIGMoRE, EvMEN cE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940).
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nished by cross-examination and that no statement should be used as
testimony until it has undergone that test. This seems to indicate that
the Court is of the opinion that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is a basic right guaranteed under the Constitution and
when the question is met it will so hold. The dissent in the principal
case was of this opinion when it said: "While the Court disclaims de-
ciding this constitutional question, no one reading the opinion will doubt
that the explicit language of its broad sweep speaks in prophecy. '8 4
There is much more involved than the accused employee's right to
work.a5 It is submitted that there is a right not to have unchallenged
and unverified suspicion and contempt with their concomitant social
and economic disadvantage cast upon an individual and his family. This
writer suggests that the due process clause does require the accused be
given an opportunity to face his accusers and to cross-examine them,
and that a decision by the Court to this effect would be fully warranted.
OLIVER W. ALPHiN
Constitutional Law-Right To Travel and Area Restrictions-
Foreign Relations Power
Worthy v. Herter1 involved a newspaperman who was denied a re-
newal 2 of his passport when he would not agree to comply with the area
restrictions3 stamped on it. The issue presented was whether the Secre-
tary of State had the power to prevent the travel of a law-abiding United
States citizen to certain areas of the world in a time when the nation
is not at war. The federal district court dismissed the action which
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of State. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
3 4 Id. at 524.
11 The writer has made no distinction in his discussion between the rights of
private and government employees. It is submitted that there is no valid distinction
to be made. Both require security clearances; the effect of dismissal is the same;
the constitutional guarantees appear to be the same. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Trauax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), with Slochower v.
Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183(1952). The danger to national security is the same, Parker v. Lester, 112 F.
Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), and each is in fact engaged in government work, often
at the same place.
1270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
'It appears that Worthy had traveled to Hungary and Communist China on his
previous passport. This would explain why the State Department took occasion
to ask Worthy about his intended use of a renewed passport.
At the present time the following inscription is stamped in U.S. passports:
"This passport is not valid for travel to the following areas under control of
authorities with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations: Al-
bania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam under Com-
munist control." Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on De-
partment of State Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as 1957 Hearings].
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